2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2122

23

24 25

26

2728

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

GORDON K. HIRABAYASHI,

Petitioner,

NO. C83-122V

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

VS.

Respondent.

PETITIONER'S HEARING MEMORANDUM

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner seeks issuance of a writ of error coram nobis to vacate his criminal convictions of October 20, 1942 of two violations of Public Law No. 503: failure to observe a curfew as required by Public Proclamation No. 3 and refusal to be evacuated as required by Civilian Exclusion Order No. 57. The relief requested by Petitioner is based on numerous acts of misconduct by different agencies of the Government during and after Petitioner's trial.

PETITIONER'S HEARING MEMORANDUM-1

FACTS

I. OFFICIALS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT ALTERED AND DESTROYED EVIDENCE AND WITHHELD EVIDENCE FROM THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, SUPREME COURT, AND PETITIONER.

Edward J. Ennis, Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Justice Department, was responsible for supervising preparation of the Government's briefs in <u>Hirabayashi v. United States</u>, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), which was set for argument before the Supreme Court on May 10, 1943. Ennis formally requested the War Department, the Government agency responsible for the evacuation program, to supply "any published material" in the Department's possession that would help in preparation for trial.

Pursuant to his outstanding request, Ennis was told in April 1943 that a report entitled "Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942," prepared by General DeWitt, was being rushed off the press. DeWitt sent six printed and bound copies of this initial Final Report to the War Department. These copies were accompanied by cover letter dated April 15, 1943.

In April 1943, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy received printed and bound copies of the Final Report, which contained the military's justification for the evacuation. Upon review of this report, McCloy objected to the Government's admission that it was impossible to determine the loyal from disloyal Japanese and that therefore the time needed to determine loyalty of the Japanese Americans had not been a factor in its decision to recommend evacuation. Second, McCloy objected to the racist implications of the assertion that it was impossible to

.

PETITIONER'S HEARING MEMORANDUM-2

3

4 5

6

7

9

10

12

13

14

15 16

17

18 19

20

21

22

24

25

26

2728

Final Report and without being advised as to the military's true position, the Justice Department asserted in its <u>Hirabayashi</u> brief to the Supreme Court that the evacuation of the Japanese

population on the West Coast was necessary because of the lack of

establish the identity of loyal individuals. McCloy understood

that these statements could potentially expose the Government's

violation of Petitioner's right to due process; destroy the

Government's credibility before the Supreme Court; and risk the

As a result, McCloy directed that the Final Report be

altered and withheld from the Justice Department. All circulated

copies of the Report were recalled, galley proofs were destroyed,

and transmittal letters were redated. Without access to the

sufficient time in which to make loyalty determinations.

Although circulated within the War Department, War Department officials withheld general release of the Final Report until January 1944. The purge of the War Department records erased any hint of the existence of the original Final Report. The facts surrounding the suppression of this evidence came to light after the recent discovery of a copy of the original Final Report and of the documents relating to its alteration and destruction.

II. OFFICIALS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT SUPPRESSED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS WHICH REFUTED ALLEGED DISLOYALTY AND ESPIONAGE ACTS OF JAPANESE AMERICANS.

Since early 1942, officials of the War Department and the Justice Department routinely received reports from the Office of

PETITIONER'S HEARING MEMORANDUM-3

outcome of the Hirabayashi case.

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21

2223

24

25

2627

28

Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Military Intelligence Division of DeWitt's Command (MID), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). These reports conclusively refuted all allegations of disloyalty and espionage and discredited the "military necessity" claim offered in support of the mass evacuation and incarceration of Japanese Americans. However, none of this exculpatory evidence was disclosed to the Petitioner or to the courts that considered Petitioner's case.

A. Suppression of the ONI Report to the Chief of Naval Operations on the Loyalty of Japanese Americans and the Munson Reports.

By 1940 the ONI, pursuant to the "Delimitation Agreement," was assigned primary responsibility for investigation of the Japanese American population on the West Coast. Among the most significant of the intelligence reports suppressed by Government officials in Petitioner's case was the ONI Report entitled "Report on the Japanese Question" (the "ONI Report"), submitted on January 26, 1942, and prepared by Lt. Commander Kenneth D. Ringle at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Lt. Commander Ringle, recognized expert on Japanese Americans and then officer in charge of naval intelligence matters in the Los Angeles area, explicitly recommended against mass evacuation or other restrictive measures directed against Japanese Americans as a group. The report made it clear that allegedly disloyal Japanese Americans, estimated at less than 3%, could easily be identified and segregated. It concluded that the

.1

3

4 5

6

8

10

12

13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

21

23

24

2526

27

28

Japanese Americans were "Americanized," and that the vast majority were loyal to the United States and presented little danger to military security.

In accordance with the "Delimitation Agreement" between federal intelligence agencies, the ONI Report was available to the FBI and to General DeWitt through the MID. The ONI Report came to the personal attention of both Attorney General Biddle and Assistant Secretary of War McCloy before General DeWitt issued the curfew and exclusion orders applicable to Petitioner. The substance and conclusions of the ONI Report came to the attention of Justice Department officials during preparation of the Government's brief to the Supreme Court in Hirabayashi.

In an April 1943 memorandum from Ennis to Solicitor General Fahy, Ennis acknowledged the ONI as the agency primarily responsible for the intelligence work regarding the Japanese Americans; recognized that a report written by Ringle for the War Relocation Authority (WRA) was the most reasonable and objective discussion of the security problem presented by the Japanese minority; urged that care be taken in arguing any position or facts more hostile to the Japanese than the position set forth in the report; and urged careful consideration by the Justice Department of the duty to advise the Court of the existence of Ringle's WRA report and the fact that it represented the view of the ONI.

Furthermore, just prior to the outbreak of the war,
Curtis B. Munson, a well-to-do Chicago businessman, was assigned

.1

PETITIONER'S HEARING MEMORANDUM-5

 to informally collect intelligence for President Roosevelt on the ethnic Japanese on the West Coast and in Hawaii. He reported to John F. Carter, an unofficial advisor to the President, who in turn passed on these reports to Roosevelt. Munson wrote three reports from November 1941 through December of 1942 and concluded both before and after Pearl Harbor that there was no Japanese "problem." He reported that the degree of loyalty within the Japanese ethnic population was small and not demonstrably greater than other racial groups and concluded that mass evacuation was unnecessary and not militarily justified.

Although Attorney General Biddle, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, and Solicitor General Fahy each personally knew that the ONI Report directly controverted the statements made to the Court on the loyalty issue, the Government failed to disclose the ONI Report or Munson's reports to the Petitioner. Moreover, Government's brief to the Supreme Court in <u>Hirabayashi</u> failed to mention these available intelligence reports.

B. Suppression of Reports of the MID, the FBI, and the FCC that Refuted the Espionage Allegations in the Final Report.

The reports of the MID, the FBI, and FCC show the falsity of the espionage allegations made in the Final Report. Well before the outbreak of the war between the United States and Japan, the FBI and FCC were actively investigating espionage activities on the West Coast and elsewhere in the country. The MID, FBI, and FCC found no evidence of Japanese American involvement in espionage or sabotage, yet both versions of the Final Report

.1

PETITIONER'S HEARING MEMORANDUM-6

3

4

5

7

8

9

11

12

13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

22

2324

25

26

27

included as a military justification the discredited allegations of shore-to-ship signalling and radio transmissions.

III. THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO ADVISE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE FALSITY OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE FINAL REPORT.

Evidence contained in the reports submitted by responsible intelligence agencies provided officials of the War Department and the Justice Department with personal knowledge of exculpatory evidence relevant to issues central to Petitioner's case. This evidence discredited the "military necessity" claim offered by the Government in support of the curfew restrictions and the evacuation program.

The Government had a continuing duty to bring this evidence to the Court's attention. After <u>Hirabayashi</u>, Ennis attempted to advise the Court of the falsity of the Final Report in the Government's brief to the Supreme Court in <u>Korematsu v. United States</u>, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). However, at the insistence of the War Department, the Justice Department disregarded this effort and prevented the Court from learning of the exculpatory intelligence reports and the falsity of the Final Report.

IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S ABUSE OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL NOTICE AND THE MANIPULATION OF THE AMICUS BRIEFS CONSTITUTED A FRAUD UPON THE COURTS.

The Government employed the doctrine of judicial notice to present to the Court the discredited allegation that "racial characteristics" of Japanese Americans predisposed them to disloyalty and to the commission of espionage and sabotage. The Government made these allegations despite knowledge of contrary

.1

28

3

4 5

6

8 9

10

12

13

14 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

23

24

25 26

27

28

judicial notice by the Government resulted in a fraud upon the Courts.

evidence in its possession. This abuse of the doctrine of

Though War Department officials withheld copies of the Final Report from the Justice Department until January 1944, a significant portion of the contents of the original Final Report was effectively presented to the Supreme Court in the <u>Hirabayashi</u> case through an amicus brief submitted by the Western States of Washington, Oregon, and California.

By concealing the Final Report from the Justice Department, yet assuring its introduction through friendly amici, the War Department manipulated the judicial process and placed erroneous and intemperate briefs before the Court. The false picture led the Court to conclude that the military orders at issue were justified by military necessity.

DISCUSSION

I. BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, HE IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF BY WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS.

The writ of error <u>coram nobis</u> is available by statute, 28 USC § 1651(a), to challenge a federal criminal conviction obtained by the Government through constitutional or fundamental errors that render a proceeding irregular and invalid. <u>United States v. Morgan</u>, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).

Coram nobis relief is warranted where government abuses "offend elementary standards of justice," cause "serious prejudice to the accused," or, even absent such prejudice,

.1

PETITIONER'S HEARING MEMORANDUM-8

3

5

6

8

9

11

12

13

14 15

16

17

18 19

20

21

23

24

25

26

27 28 "undermine public confidence in the administration of justice."

<u>United States v. Taylor</u>, 648 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir.), <u>cert den</u>.

454 U.S. 866 (1981). As stated in <u>Taylor</u>, the leading Ninth Circuit case,

... prosecutorial misconduct may so pollute a criminal prosecution as to require a new trial, especially when the taint in the proceedings seriously prejudices the accused.... When a conviction is secured by methods that offend elementary standards of justice, the Fourteenth Amendment defendant may invoke the guarantees of a fundamentally fair trial.... Moreover, this principle is not strictly limited to those situations in which the defendant has suffered arguable prejudice, the principle is designed to maintain also public confidence in the administration of justice.

(Emphasis added.) Id. at 571.

Because the Government's abuses in this case could reasonably be deemed to have affected the outcome, Petitioner is entitled to coram nobis relief vacating his conviction. It is then for the Government to decide if it wants to seek a new trial to determine guilt or innocence in fair proceedings. Although the Ninth Circuit in Taylor did not state the extent of prosecutorial malfeasance necessary to warrant relief, it is clear from a close reading of the case that it is not necessary for Petitioner to show that the result would have been different. It is only necessary to show that the malfeasance could have affected the result and thereby rendered the proceedings unfair and offended elementary standards of justice. Id. at 571.

In addition, <u>coram nobis</u> relief is warranted where

Government abuses seriously prejudice the accused or where, even absent such prejudice, the abuses undermine the public confidence

PETITIONER'S HEARING MEMORANDUM-9

in the administration of justice or otherwise interfere with the judicial process vital to a democracy. The <u>Taylor</u> decision clearly states that guilt or innocence is not the fundamental consideration in due process arguments. The court cites Justice Frankfurter:

This Court has rejected the notion that because a conviction is established on incontestable proof of guilt it may stand, no matter how the proof was secured. Observance of due process has to do not with questions of guilt of innocence but the mode by which guilt is ascertained. <u>Irvine v. California</u>, 347 U.S. at 148, 74 S. Ct. at 391 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting.)

Id. at 571, n.20.

The <u>Taylor</u> court ordered the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if the abuses of the prosecution were serious enough to warrant a new trial. <u>Taylor</u>, 648 F.2d at 574. It was not the purpose of the evidentiary hearing to determine guilt or innocence. If the abuses were proven, then a new trial would be ordered.

An examination of the facts in <u>Taylor</u> confirms that the Ninth Circuit was not focusing on a standard requiring evidence so extensive that it compelled a different result. The petitioner in <u>Taylor</u> complained that the government falsely asserted that it had subpoenaed a particular document and, since the document was not produced, was allowed to place before the court other evidence of the contents of the document. Petitioner Taylor asserted that no subpoena was ever issued. The evidence submitted in place of the document was damaging to petitioner's case. The court ruled that "Taylor's claim of government fraud

PETITIONER'S HEARING MEMORANDUM-10

6

9

11

10

12 13

14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21

23

24

25 26

27

28

PETITIONER'S HEARING MEMORANDUM-11

would, if proven, meet the various tests for relief in the nature of <u>coram nobis</u>." <u>Taylor</u>, 648 F.2d at 571. Thus, it was not necessary for petitioner Taylor to prove that he would have been acquitted but for the government's misconduct. Instead, it was enough that the misconduct involved important evidence that rendered the proceedings unfair.

If, as the Ninth Circuit states, the abuses in <u>Taylor</u> were serious enough to warrant relief, the abuses in the case at bar are vastly more serious and pervasive in the proceedings involving Petitioner. Moreover, the particular abuses affect matters specifically relied upon by the Court in reaching its decision.

- II. THE PROSECUTION'S USE OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND THE SUPPRESSION OF MATERIALLY FAVORABLE EVIDENCE IN THE PETITIONER'S TRIAL AND APPEALS CONSTITUTED A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND REQUIRES THAT PETITIONER'S CONVICTIONS BE VACATED.
 - A. Standards of Materiality.

In order to present the strongest possible case to the courts, the Government placed before the trial court and appellate courts a "tailored" factual record to support its claim that "military necessity" justified the imposition of the military curfew and exclusion orders. The record before the courts contained false and inaccurate evidence to support this justification. In addition, the Government suppressed evidence which refuted its claim of "military necessity." Ead the courts been provided with accurate and credible facts, the military orders and the federal statute making it a criminal offense to

.1