

Feb 2, 1982  
UCLA Asian American Studies Center

Dear Mary and Bill,

Think of you both often. Today I got the courage to send to J.J. McCloy - anonymously, of course - the N.Y. Nichibei report of your testimony before the N.Y. hearing, Bill, and a copy of the "Concentration Camps USA: It has happened here" booklet about your experiences, Mary! His conscience needs picking from time to time - if he has a conscience! Taxi gave Bill's <sup>and her report of it</sup> ~~appearance~~ <sup>appearance</sup> a swell headline which I especially wanted McCloy to see, since he so adores grabbing the credit for the 442nd's formation (more rightly due Elmer Davis of the Office of War Information). If ever you want <sup>to</sup> give him a piece of your mind, Bill or Mary, address communique

to 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza N.Y. N.Y.

Walter and I appreciated your greetings for the holidays and the New Year. Let's hope "El ~~Sun~~ Schumuk-o" (our appellation for Reagan) comes to his senses before we go over the precipice. We so hope that '82 will treat you and all in your dear family kindly.

Things continue to look grim for Choh So. We're presently trying to get Senator Kennedy interested in his plight. Do stay well in this crazy weather.

Love, Michie

P.S. Enclosed is a document which <sup>also w/c. Note,</sup> may not be new or all that shocking by now. Also the latest discount offering involving Infamy. Which I'd greatly appreciate your passing on to anyone who might possibly be interested.



WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

Notes on Evacuation of Japanese from Hawaiian Islands ✓

1. About 100,000 would be involved.
2. It should be done. GSA, WARS  
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
Hyde Park, N. Y.
3. Evacuation to an island of the group considered inadvisable:
  - (a) It would involve much shipping and much construction (there is now a shortage of both)
  - (b) It would require an additional division to be sent to Hawaiian command, with additional shipping requirements - immediately and monthly.
  - (c) It would impose a heavy and dangerous burden on local commander, with hazard of Japanese descent on that particular island with its air fields, as initial toe hold.
4. Evacuation to mainland should be carried out utilizing empty ships returning to west coast.

But

- (a) It should not be carried out until reinforcing troops for scattered islands are mostly in position.
- (b) It should be carried out somewhat at discretion of local commanders to meet labor problem, get friendly but burdensome loyal people out of the way, etc.
- (c) It must be coordinated with facilities to accommodate evacuees in U.S.

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SEVAREID: Mr. McCloy, there's one other controversial thing in the War that I wanted to ask you about, and that was this moving of the Japanese-Americans from the West Coast back into these camps inland, that practically everybody's regretted ever since it was done--

McCLOY: Yeah.

SEVAREID: --and I think Earl Warren, I guess, who was Governor or District Attorney of California at the time, has regretted it. Some people known as political liberals had something to do with that. You were involved in that to some degree at least.

McCLOY: Hm-hmm, hm-hmm. I was, yes.

SEVAREID: And I wondered why on earth was it done that way?

McCLOY: Well, let me try to give you the picture of it. It's a little difficult to see it from this perspective. But in the first place, the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, and they-- the shock that that created was a shock that I think that very few people now realize the depth and the sense of unless they were there on the ground, and they-- oh, the old-- the Yellow Menace concept that pretty well pervaded the thinking on the West Coast. But at any rate, after Pearl Harbor there was this enormous shock, and there was-- there was this-- appeals coming immediately from the Commanding General out there. What was his name?

SEVAREID: DeWitt?

McCLOY: DeWitt, General DeWitt, as well as from the Governor, as you mentioned - Warren - and-- and there was this somewhat-- this-- this hysterical situation. We didn't know then whether the Japs-- Japanese were going to attack the West Coast or whether they weren't. Indeed, they did send a submarine over there, but we'd had the shock of this fleet episode. One of the things that we don't realize was occurring then, don't-- not aware of now as much as we were then - of the barn burnings that were starting in that valley where the Japanese were. There were Japanese-- and the local situation was getting out of hand, and it was-- you had to protect a lot of the Japanese people. At any rate, Mr. Roosevelt was called-- was in on it, and he was in favor of it. And then we had to move a hundred thousand people, or whatever it was.

SEVAREID: Well, that should be done by normal police methods.

McCLOY: Well, yes, but it was-- it-- it was-- the barn burnings were-- were getting beyond it, and there were-- Well, at any rate, that was one of the things that was-- that was sent to us. We don't know that we can control this situation if it gets much worse than it is now. But the decision was a civilian decision. It wasn't an Army decision. But the only fellows that could carry it out were the Army. They were the only people that knew how to move people and do that sort of thing. So, I was sort of told off to do this, and I went out there and spent a lot of time on it. I do think the thing was rather benign in the way it was carried out. Later on, I spent a lot of time trying to get them - did get - compensation for the--

SEVAREID: They lost so much.

McCLOY: They lost an awful lot. Well, it was overnight they were kicked out.

SEVAREID: People just ripped them off.

McCLOY: And they-- And they-- And the shops were closed and everything else, but they-- and they weren't adequately compensated....



4. William Denman, who was one of the judges of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco. He became the Chief Judge of said Circuit Court. He told me orally in his chambers that he had a conversation in San Francisco with John J. McCloy who told him that he, John J. McCloy, realized that what this government had done to the Japanese was an outrage and that he intended to devote the rest of his life to making it up to our Issei and Nisei who had been <sup>miserable</sup> so terribly mistreated.

So far as my knowledge is concerned the said John J. McCloy who subsequently became the High Commissioner of West Germany did not raise his hand or voice publicly or privately to do one damn thing for our Issei, Nisei or Sansei and has been silent on the subject ever since. I have read somewhere that he was a millionaire. When, if ever, has a millionaire ever raised his voice in protest against wrongdoing? Besides, if he had a tinge of conscience at any one time it probably departed when he was appointed High Commissioner. That is typical of oppressors who feel the pangs of conscience only when they have nothing at stake. The consciences of our oppressive Attorneys General, ~~their~~ various Assistant Attorneys General and ~~the~~ Acting Attorneys General and various assistants and U. S. attorneys, along with those of military commanders and their subordinates, and several presidents of the United States apparently were suspended from operation during World War II and since then.

Perhaps McCloy has postponed doing anything for this unfortunate group. Let us hope his conscience, if he has one, returns some day.